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Abstract 
Extensive research has demonstrated the existence of large potential welfare gains from trade 
facilitation—measures to reduce the overall costs of the international movement of goods. From an 
equity perspective an important question is how those benefits are distributed across and within 
nations. After discussing the possible impacts of trade facilitation, we use firm-level data for a wide 
variety of developing countries to investigate whether it is mostly large firms that benefit from trade 
facilitation. We find that firms of all sizes export more in response to improved trade facilitation. Our 
results suggest that trade facilitation can be beneficial in a range of countries, including those that are 
primarily involved in value chains as suppliers. 
Keywords 
Trade facilitation; trade costs; WTO; firm-level data; developing countries; global value chains; 
supply chains. 
JEL Codes: F13; F14; O24. 
 1 
1. Introduction 
The term “trade facilitation” has a variety of context-dependent meanings. At the WTO, it refers 
primarily to the reform of border management processes designed to make import and export 
transactions easier, thus reducing the cost of trade. In other fora, such as the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), it refers to a broader set of policies that may have an impact on trade costs – 
e.g., including policy measures that affect the efficiency of transport and logistics services. This 
second meaning encompasses the WTO focus but goes much beyond it. In this paper we take a broad 
view of trade facilitation as including any policy action—including streamlining of border 
management processes—that tends to reduce international trade costs. Trade costs in turn refer to the 
full range of factors that drive a wedge between export and import prices. Trade facilitation can 
therefore be seen as the “technology” of international trade—the set of policies and procedures that 
makes it possible for exporters and importers to engage in mutually beneficial transactions and that 
defines the total cost of getting a good from one country into another. 
Extensive empirical evidence, some of which is discussed in Section 2, suggests that trade 
facilitation can give a significant boost to bilateral trade, export diversification, and economic welfare. 
Although most papers focus on quantifying the benefits of trade facilitation, those that also take into 
account the investment dimension uniformly find that although the up-front costs can be substantial, 
they are significantly outweighed by the benefits.
1
 Trade facilitation is therefore a “good deal” for 
countries. Although trade facilitation can be expected to have a significant net benefit for reforming 
countries in aggregate terms, there is a question as to how those gains are distributed, especially in the 
context of global value chains (GVCs) that may be dominated by large “lead” firms that are 
headquartered in developed nations. One possibility is that all firms in the value chain gain from better 
trade facilitation, because lead firms and their suppliers are all able to operate with lower costs and 
overall turnover expands. Another possibility that has been discussed in the literature, however, is that 
the gains from trade cost reductions are appropriated as rents by lead firms, because these firms have 
market power and/or suppliers are locked into dealing with specific lead firms. The result is that 
large/lead firms capture most of the gains, and workers in (owners of) supplying firms do not share in 
the benefits.
2
 A variant of this argument that has been put forward in the WTO negotiations on trade 
facilitation is that developing countries may not benefit from trade facilitation initiatives if they are 
large net importers. One way such concerns have been articulated by some developing country 
negotiators is to note that trade balances for developing countries are often in deficit, and to infer from 
this that lower trade costs will expand imports more than exports, thus worsening the initial imbalance 
(South Centre, 2011; ICTSD, 2012). This is a misconceived concern, because the overall balance of 
payments is not determined by trade costs but by macroeconomic variables (the savings-investment 
balance). Thus a reduction in trade costs cannot worsen the trade balance.
3
 However, the concern 
could be understood in rent capture terms: that in countries that are large net importers the savings 
from trade facilitation are not passed on to domestic consumers and importing firms but are captured 
                                                     
1
 As discussed below, here much depends on how broadly the concept of trade facilitation is defined and in particular 
whether it includes transport infrastructure. 
2
 See e.g., Milberg and Winkler (2010), Barrientos et al. (2011), Berhardt and Milberg (2011), and Gereffi (2013). Mayer 
and Milberg (2013) make a similar argument in discussing the effects of Aid for Trade. While these strands of the 
research literature focus on the distributional impacts of GVCs and not specifically on the effects of trade facilitation, 
GVCs are directly impacted by any reduction in trade costs.  
3
 A reading of the way the balance of payments concerns have been raised in the WTO discussions suggest that the cause 
of the confusion is in part due to a misreading of the results in the literature on the effects of trade facilitation. Influential 
papers by Wilson et al. (2003; 2005) report results from gravity regressions in terms of estimated increases in a country’s 
exports and its imports. If a country imports much more from a partner than it exports, trade facilitation measures will 
have a greater effect on the volume of imports than on exports. But this does not mean the overall balance of trade will be 
affected as the type of methodology used in these studies ignores the overall balance-of-payments financing constraint.  
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by the (foreign) firms – whether lead firms in GVCs or specialized international distributors – that are 
the source of the imports. 
Arguments that large multinational firms – and thus, implicitly, developed countries – will capture 
most of the benefits from trade facilitation depend on there being a lack of competition among such 
firms, or at least that suppliers face substantial switching costs that effectively make it impossible to 
deal with other GVCs in the same sector. It is an empirical question whether all of the firms in a GVC 
will benefit. If most of the gains from better trade facilitation are appropriated by lead firms, we would 
expect to see that reflected in firm-level data. Specifically, we would expect to see that better trade 
facilitation is an important determinant of export behavior for large firms, but not for small ones. This 
paper contributes to the trade facilitation literature by testing that hypothesis with firm-level data for a 
wide range of developing countries, sourced from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys project. 
Although there is some variation in results according to sector, our general findings suggest that the 
gains from trade facilitation accrue to large and small firms alike: all size classes of firms export more 
in response to improved trade facilitation. There is limited evidence that small firms may not 
experience substantial gains from trade facilitation in the garments sector, but the data are relatively 
weak on this point, and the finding is not repeated in other sectors, or when the data are pooled across 
all sectors. Our findings therefore contribute to the policy debate on the distribution of the benefits of 
trade facilitation, as well as to the emerging firm-level literature on the export effects of improved 
trade facilitation (e.g., Shepherd, 2013). 
Against this background, the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical evidence 
on the benefits and costs of trade facilitation. In Section 3, we examine trade facilitation from the point 
of view of firms involved in GVCs. Section 4 presents our dataset and empirical results. Section 5 
concludes, and discusses the policy implications of our findings. 
2. Benefits and Costs of Trade Facilitation 
Most published work on trade facilitation—whether using the narrow or broad definition—focuses 
exclusively on the benefits. Only a relatively small number of papers also consider the upfront 
investment costs that may need to be incurred to obtain any benefits. However, the finding from this 
literature is clear and consistent: the benefits of trade facilitation far outweigh the costs, which means 
that improving trade facilitation is well worth the initial investment costs it implies. It follows from 
this finding that there is also a strong case for providing aid resources to deal with these up-front costs: 
the published research on the effectiveness of aid for trade facilitation shows that it has a strongly 
trade-promoting effect (Cali and te Velde, 2011; Helble et al., 2012). In this section, we review some 
of the literature in this area, starting with contributions that assess the benefits of trade facilitation, and 
then moving to the small number of papers that also consider costs. 
2.1 Evidence on the Benefits of Trade Facilitation 
The mechanisms by which trade facilitation can promote economic gains are well known. Taking the 
broad definition—in which trade facilitation is any policy action that reduces trade costs—shows that 
the key lies in an understanding of the factors that impede bilateral trade. Trade costs drive a wedge 
between export and import prices. As a result of this wedge, producers export less than they would in a 
world with lower trade costs, and consumers purchase less of each traded product, as well as a 
narrower range of products, than they otherwise would. Trade facilitation, which reduces the size of 
this wedge, therefore brings producers and consumers in different countries into closer contact, and 
tends to increase producer surplus in exporting countries, and consumer surplus in importing 
countries. Trade facilitation supports the process of economic integration through trade, which can, 
under appropriate circumstances, lead to rising national incomes, faster productivity growth, and 
poverty reduction. 
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There are two types of empirical evidence showing that improved trade facilitation can have 
significant economic benefits, econometric analyses and computable general equilibrium models. 
Econometric analyses use different measures of trade facilitation, with many of the more recent papers 
using either the World Bank’s Doing Business database or the World Bank’s Logistics Performance 
Indicators (Arvis et al. 2012). Much of the econometric research employs gravity regression models. A 
representative example is Djankov Freund and Pham (2010) who use export time as measured by the 
World Bank’s Doing Business project as an indicator of national trade facilitation performance. This 
measure includes document preparation, inland transit, passage through customs and other border 
agencies, and port and terminal handling. It therefore captures a number of important elements of trade 
facilitation in both the broad and narrow senses. They estimate a gravity model for 98 countries in 
which the dependent variable is the value of bilateral trade. In addition to standard gravity model 
control variables, they include the Doing Business time to export measure. They find that it is a 
significant determinant of bilateral trade flows. Concretely, an extra day’s delay is associated with a 
reduction in bilateral trade of at least one percent.  
Research of this type has been undertaken by numerous authors all of whom arrive at similar 
conclusions: trade facilitation (and lack of trade facilitation) matters importantly as a determinant of 
overall trade costs and is likely to have a larger impact on trade flows than import tariffs.
4 
 A 
particularly careful and detailed recent analysis of the potential impacts of what is on the table in the 
WTO trade facilitation talks – which as mentioned does not include infrastructure and related services 
– by Moïsé and Sorescu (2013), based on a comprehensive new dataset of trade facilitation indicators 
(Moïsé, Orliac and Minor, 2012) estimates that implementing the various elements of what has been 
proposed in the Doha Round would lower developing country trade costs by around 14 percent. 
Saslavsky and Shepherd (2012) provide complementary evidence specific to the case of GVCs. 
Using a gravity model with trade in machinery parts and components as a proxy for goods traded 
within GVCs and using the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Indicators, they find that intra-GVC 
trade is more sensitive to improvements in logistics performance—another important aspect of trade 
facilitation—than trade in other types of goods. Indeed, the link between logistics performance (trade 
facilitation) and trade in GVC products is about 50% stronger than for other goods. Trade facilitation 
is thus particularly important in the case of GVCs. 
This type of research shows that improved trade facilitation has strong potential to boost trade, 
benefiting producers and consumers alike. However, the gravity model approach limits the assessment 
to one of the likely trade effects of improvements; it does not allow a direct assessment of economic 
welfare (real income) effects. Although more trade does not directly translate into improvements in 
economic welfare, reductions in trade costs do insofar as such costs are “wasteful” and do not generate 
rents. Trade facilitation to some extent involves the elimination of resource waste – e.g., duplicative 
procedural requirements and paperwork – in contrast to trade liberalization (e.g., lowering tariffs), 
which mainly reallocates resources and in the process generates efficiency gains. Trade facilitation 
lowers costs and hence prices, both to consumers and to firms that import production inputs, and 
therefore increases real disposable incomes and/or profits. Moreover, firms and consumers may gain 
access to a wider variety of goods as the fixed costs of getting products into the market fall.  
Computable general equilibrium models of the world economy pick up these effects. While they 
only provide a rough sense of the orders of magnitude involved because there is little information of 
the extent to which trade facilitation measures will reduce waste, the extant models generally suggest 
that the economy-wide gains from trade facilitation can be very substantial. Francois et al. (2005) 
conclude that the national income effects from improved trade facilitation can be up to twice or three 
times as large as those that result from removing all tariffs globally on manufactured goods. A more 
recent CGE-based analysis, WEF (2013), incorporates econometric estimates of the impacts of a 
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number of specific trade facilitation-related variables, and concludes that if countries pursue ambitious 
improvements in trade facilitation the ratio could be on the order of five or more. Concerted action to 
raise the average trade facilitation performance of countries to halfway the level of best practice 
(defined by Singapore) could increase global GDP by almost 5%, six times more than would result 
from removing all remaining import tariffs.
5
 Of course, achieving trade facilitation improvements will 
require investments, while tariff reductions require only the stroke of a pen. However, many of the 
barriers that are modeled in WEF (2013) can be traced to policy and regulatory measures that will not 
require significant investment to reform/improve.  
In addition to boosting bilateral trade—particularly trade taking place within GVCs— and 
increasing national income, trade facilitation can also contribute to the important development policy 
aim of export diversification. Moving along the extensive margin of trade is important for developing 
countries: selling goods in which a comparative advantage exists to additional countries, and entering 
into the production of new types of products. Both dimensions of diversification are part and parcel of 
GVC participation and are likely to be facilitated through such participation. The reason is that GVCs 
allow firms to specialize in narrow activities and tasks in which they are competitive. Trade 
facilitation helps in entering and exploiting such niches by lowering the fixed costs of participation in 
international trade (GVCs). Such costs are particularly important barriers to internationalization for 
small companies which are of course particularly prevalent in developing countries (Baldwin, 2012).  
Dennis and Shepherd (2011) show that improving trade facilitation helps promote export 
diversification by making it easier for countries to export “new” products, in the sense of products 
they currently do not export. Their modeling approach is not based on a gravity formulation, although 
the variables included are quite similar, in that the dependent variable is the number of eight-digit 
products a country exports to the EU (taken as a representative developed country market). Using a 
sample of 118 developing countries, Dennis and Shepherd (2011) find that a 10% reduction in the 
costs associated with the aspects of trade facilitation considered by Djankov, Freund and Pham (2010) 
is associated with a 3% increase in the number of products exported. Trade facilitation therefore not 
only promotes greater bilateral trade between countries, but also makes it easier for developing 
countries to export a wider range of products—which is an important development goal. 
2.2 Evidence on the Benefit-Cost Balance of Trade Facilitation 
The papers discussed in the previous section only deal with the benefits of trade facilitation. In this 
subsection, we consider contributions that assess both the benefits and costs. We first consider two 
examples from the gravity model literature, before turning to an additional contribution that examines 
the costs and benefits of trade facilitation in general equilibrium, from a welfare standpoint. 
Gravity models can be combined with a project costing model to analyze the benefits and costs of 
specific types of trade facilitation improvement such as road quality upgrading. Buys et al. (2010) do 
this for the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, and Shepherd and Wilson (2007) for the case of Europe and 
Central Asia. Both papers find the expected trade gains from improved road connectivity quickly 
dwarf the initial investment costs, even though the latter can be substantial, especially in Africa. Buys 
et al. (2010) find that road upgrading could expand overland trade among Sub-Saharan African 
countries by up to $250bn over 15 years. Using a World Bank road costing model based on extensive 
data from previous road projects, they estimate that the initial investment cost would be of the order of 
$20bn, and that an additional $1bn would be required annually for maintenance. There is thus a strong 
net benefit from trade facilitation by improving road connectivity, even once substantial upgrading 
costs are accounted for. 
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 The focus of the WEF (2013) analysis is on the impact of two trade facilitation measures: border management (customs 
clearance and other regulatory requirements and processes that pertain to goods entering or leaving a country) and 
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Who Profits From Trade Facilitation Initiatives? 
5 
Mirza (2009) takes a general equilibrium approach to assessing the costs and benefits of trade 
facilitation. She contributes to the literature in two main ways. First, she includes a capital goods 
sector in the economy, which produces trade-related infrastructure. This innovation means that 
investment carries an opportunity cost, i.e., the resources could be productively used elsewhere in the 
economy. Second, she includes data and parameters in the model to characterize border efficiency 
across countries, and its impact on trade. The basis for this approach is the World Bank’s Logistics 
Performance Index. Econometric models make it possible to estimate a relationship between logistics 
performance and the estimated stock of trade-related capital, and between logistics performance and 
trade. Putting these various elements together provides a general equilibrium setting for analyzing the 
costs and benefits of trade facilitation. 
Against this background, Mirza (2009) finds that there is a strong net benefit from trade facilitation 
in economic welfare terms, even when the initial investment costs are netted out. Concretely, an 
improvement of about 1% in Sub-Saharan Africa’s logistics performance requires an up-front 
investment of around $18bn. The estimated welfare gains from this improvement are much larger, on 
the order of $70bn. The benefit-cost balance is therefore strongly positive even in a general 
equilibrium setting. This result reinforces the narrower findings of Buys et al. (2010), and Shepherd 
and Wilson (2007). 
More generally, the net returns of trade facilitation measures will be a function of how trade 
facilitation is defined. Under the WTO it will mostly involve border management process-related 
measures such as the use of information technology; risk assessment; etc. that do not involve a need 
for major investment in infrastructure. Estimates of the likely costs of implementing a WTO 
agreement are much lower than the costs associated with transport infrastructure upgrading and are 
expected to be in the US$5-20 million range depending on initial conditions (McLinden, 2011; OECD, 
2012). Many types of trade facilitation initiatives are low cost to implement. The fact that assessments 
that consider major investments in hard infrastructure conclude that the net return is positive and 
substantial in magnitude therefore suggests that the conclusion that there are large payoffs to trade 
facilitation is robust.  
3. Distributional Concerns and Questions 
The papers on costs and benefits of trade facilitation reviewed above take a “macro” perspective. They 
are interested in overall impacts on the volume of trade of changes in trade costs, or in overall welfare 
changes, compared with the total costs of improving trade facilitation. They do not deal with 
distributional issues, i.e., how the net benefits are allocated across different groups in society or across 
different countries. The presumption in most CGE models is that there is a “representative” consumer 
who benefits from lower costs and greater variety. These models distinguish between sectors of the 
economy and do not have firm-level detail. This is also the case for gravity models, which center on 
products. Gravity models that use trade data therefore also do not allow for an assessment of the 
incidence of cost reductions on firms – the analysis focuses only on the trade effects of lower trade 
costs.  
Inefficient logistics and border management will be reflected in higher trade costs and policy 
measures such as trade facilitation should result in connecting firms and communities more closely to 
world markets, reducing the difference between domestic and world prices. But prevailing market 
structures, including market power in downstream segments of the production/value chain may affect 
the distribution of the benefits of trade facilitation by allowing some firms to capture the benefits as 
rents, with no consequent impact on prices.
6
 Alternatively, the appropriation of trade facilitation 
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improvements as rents by lead firms would prevent them from bringing benefits to upstream firms 
(small suppliers) and those directly involved in the performance of such firms (workers).
7
 
In light of the rise of GVCs in numerous sectors involving a wide range of countries, the 
distributional question is an important one. Recent analysis of trade in value added has shown that a 
large share of the value that is embodied in a traded good reflects a variety of services inputs. These 
range from the value of the knowledge and research and development that led to the design of the 
product to the value generated by ownership of the brand under which a product is marketed to 
consumers. The value of the labor and processing tasks that is needed for the assembly of the product, 
especially if this spans different stages spread out over a number of countries, is often only a small 
share of the total. The same is true for agricultural GVCs. The structure of GVCs often is centered 
around a lead firm, which may be located at the downstream end of a chain, as is the case with a large 
retailer or supermarket chain, or at the upstream end of the chain, as would be the case in high-tech 
products where most of the value is generated by the design and technology that defines the utility of 
what is being offered to buyers/consumers (e.g., aircraft, smartphones). Whatever the specifics of the 
product and the structure of the relevant GVC, the firms that drive and manage the associated 
production network will generally be much larger than their suppliers and are likely to have some 
market (price-setting) power vis-à-vis their suppliers and partners. If so, they might be able to take at 
least a portion of the gains from trade facilitation initiatives as rents, thus depriving 
consumers/suppliers of expected welfare/profit gains.  
Of particular interest (concern) then is whether it is primarily the large multinational (lead) firms 
that (will) benefit from reductions in trade costs in developing countries following improved trade 
facilitation. Monopoly power of providers of inputs and/or monopsony power on the part of buyers 
(trading companies; retailers) can lower domestic farm/factory gate prices and/or may result in retail 
prices that are higher than they would be if the relevant markets were characterized by greater 
competition. The crucial question here is whether and how much market power firms have and 
whether they use it to extract rents. The degree of market power in turn depends importantly on the 
extent of competition between value chains within the same sector. It is only if suppliers are locked 
into dealing with a single lead firm that the distributional argument has real force.
8
 There is, in fact, 
very little empirical evidence on this point, although its importance is recognized in the literature on 
value chains (e.g., Mayer and Milberg, 2013). 
Significant policy attention has been given to the question whether changing market structures and 
the rise of GVCs give rise to competition concerns because of excessive concentration/market power 
in certain parts of the supply chain—especially “buyer power” by retailers. A particular focus in this 
regard has been on the operation of markets for foodstuffs and agricultural produce. In the late 2000s, 
European national competition agencies investigated the prevalence and extent of imperfect 
competition in the food supply chain. Despite high concentration ratios at the retail level in many 
countries, the degree of competition was found to be intense, and no national competition authority 
saw a need for (or had taken) action against retailers for taking part in horizontal anti-competitive 
agreements or engaging in abuse of dominance (EU, 2009).
9
  
While large retailers (supermarkets) may have buying power, so too do major multinational food 
companies with strong brands. Insofar as retailers use their market power to bargain for better prices 
from suppliers that also have market power (the multinationals), the battle is over the distribution of 
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lower trade costs. 
8
 Lock-in effects may arise be because of a lack of competition among lead firms or because suppliers incur significant 
sunk costs due to a need to invest in GVC specific facilities and processes. 
9
 EU (2009) notes that in 2006, the average net profit margins of European retailers were around 4% as compared to 
margins for The Coca-Cola Company and Group Danone of some 20% and 11%, respectively. 
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rents.
10
 Market power at any stage of the value chain can be expected to affect the distribution of the 
rents that accrue to the agents that are involved in the chain. Thus, buyer power by retailers can be 
used to extract any rents from upstream producers –be they multinationals, wholesalers or farmers in 
developing countries. However, while such rent shifting/extraction may motivate actions by either the 
upstream producers or the government to affect their distribution, from a global welfare perspective 
what matters is whether the end result of the interaction between the firms in a given GVC results in 
higher consumer retail prices. If the effect is to lower final prices, there is not a problem from a 
consumer welfare and efficiency perspective—to the contrary. The same reasoning applies in the trade 
facilitation context. 
In many developing countries, suppliers are small firms or smallholder farmers who depend on a 
small number of buyers that have market power (oligopsony) and are thus able to extract some of the 
surplus that the export market generates. Porto et al. (2011) find that greater competition among 
processors in a sample of African countries and export crops would benefit farmers by increasing farm 
gate prices. Similarly, Improvements in rural infrastructure—which is a type of trade facilitation—
improves the incomes of agricultural smallholders, at the same time as reducing prices for consumers. 
Matters are complicated however by the fact that buyers often also provide ancillary services and 
working capital (e.g., seeds). Pervasive market failures such as lack of access to credit mean that in 
practice processors may provide inputs to farmers in return for agreement to buy their harvest at a 
negotiated price. Given weak capacity to enforce contracts through the legal system, the feasibility of 
such arrangements may depend on the buyers having some market power. Porto et al. (2011) conclude 
that if such constraints (market failures) are taken into account, the benefits of greater competition are 
reduced, but the reductions relative to a benchmark without market failures are generally small.  
Trade facilitation should help increase competitive forces; whatever the case may be in the context 
of a specific GVC with respect to efforts by a lead firm or distributors to extract the rents from trade 
facilitation efforts, trade facilitation initiatives will lower actual costs of trade and thus reduce the 
barriers to entry by new firms and the cost of switching to alternative GVCs. On the margin therefore 
trade facilitation should result in all firms in a GVC benefiting. That said, if switching and search 
costs are substantial, the benefits of trade facilitation may be distributed in a skewed fashion, with 
small suppliers seeing less in the way of gains than they would in a perfectly competitive market. At 
the end of the day the issue is an empirical one, and there is as yet very little evidence on it. Mayer and 
Milberg (2013) criticize the available quantitative evidence on the basis that it generally looks at trade 
effects at the level of country aggregates, and it is therefore impossible to see what is happening at the 
level of individual firms. There are also obvious limitations of a qualitative approach in terms of 
sample selection, omitted variables, and attribution (causation), but Mayer and Milberg (2013) argue 
that the available case study evidence on Aid for Trade—which is often centers in part on trade 
facilitation—suggests that benefits accrue to workers in cases when aid is targeted directly at them, 
rather than at the whole value chain.  
In the remainder of this paper, we seek to provide additional empirical clarity on these points by 
using a firm-level quantitative approach. 
4. Empirical Evidence: Do Small Firms Win Too? 
This section uses firm-level data to assess whether or not the impact of trade facilitation reforms 
depends on firm size. The first subsection discusses our dataset. The second presents our empirical 
model and results. 
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4.1 Data 
Table 1 provides a full list of variables and definitions used in the empirical analysis. Descriptive 
statistics are in Table 2. All data are sourced from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys. That project 
now covers over 130,000 firms in 135 countries. We use the current standardized version of the 
dataset (as at March 3, 2013), which includes data for firms in 119 developing countries and 11 
manufacturing sectors over the period 2006-2011. 
Various units of the World Bank have been conducting firm-level surveys since 2002. Since 2005-
2006, those efforts have been centralized in the Enterprise Surveys project. Although country-specific 
survey instruments are used, responses are also matched to a standardized questionnaire, and the data 
are made available in a comparable format, free of charge, on the World Bank website 
(www.enterprisesurveys.org). The World Bank does not conduct the surveys itself, but instead uses 
private contractors. The identity of survey respondents is kept confidential, due to the sensitive nature 
of much of the data collected. Each survey typically covers one year of data, but for some key 
variables—such as sales and employment—firms are asked to provide data for the last fiscal year, and 
three fiscal years ago. However, even when countries appear more than once in the dataset—as is 
frequently the case—it is not possible to create a true firm level panel, because anonymous firm 
identifiers are year specific, which makes it impossible to identify whether a particular firm has been 
interviewed more than once. The dataset therefore consists of a sample of firms for each country-year 
in which a survey is administered. The dimensionality of the dataset is important when it comes to 
using fixed effects in the regression analysis below. 
Typically, business owners and top managers are the survey respondents. Sometimes, they call in 
company accountants and human resource officers to assist. The sampling procedure is carefully 
controlled. Stratified random sampling is applied, with strata corresponding to firm size category, 
business sector, and geographical region within a country.  
Surveys only sample firms in the formal sector with at least five employees. In the developing 
country context, they therefore probably over-sample larger firms to some extent: 28% of the dataset is 
made up of micro-firms, 42% consists of small firms, 22% consists of medium firms, and the 
remainder (8%) is made up of large firms.
11
 The sampling frame is derived whenever possible from 
the universe of eligible firms as determined by the country’s statistical office. In other cases, the list of 
firms is obtained from tax agencies or business licensing authorities. Alternatively, business 
associations or marketing databases are used. In a few cases, the World Bank manually constructs the 
firm list after partitioning a country’s major economic cities into clusters and blocks, and then 
randomly selecting a subset of blocks to be enumerated. 
Data quality is clearly an issue for the Enterprise Surveys data, since they are collected by private 
contractors with no enforcement power in the case of misstatement, a contrast with the situation when 
firm-level surveys are conducted by national authorities. Two aspects of the data suggest that they are 
of sufficient quality for use in the present case, however. First, the Enterprise Surveys data or similar 
World Bank firm-level surveys have been widely used in published work as they represent the best 
available data for many developing countries; analysis using other data is simply not feasible. 
Examples of well-known and widely-cited papers using these data—either the Enterprise Surveys 
themselves, or their previous versions at the World Bank—include: Svensson (2003); Beck et al. 
(2004); Van Biesebroeck (2005); Dollar et al. (2006); Fisman and Svensson (2007); and Djankov et al. 
(2010). Shepherd (2013) uses the Enterprise Surveys data to assess the impact of trade facilitation on 
export performance at the firm-level, which is the same use to which the data are put here.  
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 Firm categories are defined as follows: micro, less than 10 employees; small, between 10 and 50 employees; medium, 
between 50 and 250 employees; and large, greater than 250 employees. 
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In addition to being widely used in published work, the data are cleaned by taking advantage of the 
survey administrator’s response to two questions: whether or not the questions in the survey relating to 
opinions and perceptions were answered truthfully or somewhat truthfully; and whether or not the 
questions regarding figures were taken directly from establishment records or were estimates 
computed with some precision. Firms not satisfying either of these two criteria are dropped from the 
analysis.  
4.2 Empirical Model and Results 
If it is the case that only large firms benefit from trade facilitation, we would expect to see that 
contention reflected in firm-level data. Specifically, we would expect to see that an indicator of trade 
facilitation—such as the time it takes firms to export goods—would only be negatively associated with 
export performance, as in Shepherd (2013), for large firms, not small ones. 
To examine whether or not this is in fact the case, we follow the same general approach as 
Shepherd (2013). We add interaction terms between our indicator of trade facilitation performance—
average time to export,
12
 as reported by each firm—and firm size, as proxied by dummy variables for 
micro, small, and medium enterprises. Large firms make up the excluded category. To properly 
specify such an interaction model, we also need to include the same dummies for firm size 
independently in the estimating equation. We therefore drop the logarithm of the number of 
employees, which is the variable Shepherd (2013) uses to capture firm size in his regressions. 
This approach gives the following basic estimating equation: 
( )               
 ∑∑∑    
   
      (               )       (               )       
      (               )             (               )        
                          ∑               
   
      
where: export time is the average number of days taken for direct exports between arrival at the main 
point of exit and clearance by customs, as reported by each firm; micro, small, and medium are firm 
size category dummies; controls refers to a set of firm-level control variables; and d represents a full 
set of fixed effects in the country-sector-year dimension. The dependent variable is the percentage of 
firm sales that is directly exported (without a distributor). Because it is bounded between zero and 
unity, OLS estimation is biased. We therefore use the fractional logit estimator (Papke and 
Wooldridge, 1996), which is specifically designed for this type of dependent variable. 
To give a first idea of the correlations in the data, we initially estimate the model without any 
additional controls (Table 3, column 1). Average export time has a negative and statistically 
significant (1%) coefficient, which is in line with expectations and the previous results of Shepherd 
(2013). Large firms are the excluded category from the regression, so the interpretation of this result is 
that for large firms, better trade facilitation—shorter export time—is associated with a greater 
proportion of sales being exported. To see whether this effect also holds true for smaller firms, we 
need to analyze the interaction terms that follow. In all three cases—micro, small, and medium 
firms—the interaction terms have statistically insignificant coefficients. This finding means that better 
trade facilitation has the same impact for smaller firms as it does for large ones: it improves export 
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and clearance by customs (Table 1). 
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performance. Results of this first regression therefore tend to go against the contention that trade 
facilitation only benefits large firms. 
Column 2 re-runs the same regression with a number of firm-level controls. We include capital 
intensity, the capacity utilization ratio (as a proxy for management competence), and dummies for 
majority foreign ownership and ISO-9000 certification. This specification is identical to the one in 
Shepherd (2013), except that, as previously noted, size dummies are used instead of the number of 
employees. Results for the trade facilitation variables remain substantially unchanged: the coefficient 
on average export time is negative and 1% statistically significant, and none of the interaction terms 
have a statistically significant coefficient. With the exception of the foreign ownership dummy—
which has a positive and 1% statistically significant coefficient—the control variables do not exhibit a 
statistically significant association with export performance. 
To investigate the issue further, we split the data into subsamples according to sector. In these 
specifications (Table 3, columns 3-5) we replace the country-sector-year fixed effects with country-
year fixed effects, because each regression only covers a single sector. We choose three sectors in 
which GVCs are particularly prevalent, and where the size contention may therefore play out 
differently than in the full sample: garments, food, and electronics. We rerun the regression from 
column 1—i.e., excluding firm-level controls—for each sector separately. We do not include the 
additional firm level controls from column 2 in order to preserve sample size, which is very small in 
electronics; in any event, results from column 2 show that addition of the control variables does not 
substantially change our results on trade facilitation. 
Results show some degree of variability according to sector. Interestingly, export time has a 
coefficient that is considerably larger in absolute value than in the full sample regression for garments, 
and especially electronics. This result lines up well with findings from the cross-country (gravity 
model) literature, which show that the kinds of goods traded within GVCs tend to be more sensitive to 
improvements in trade facilitation than other types of goods (Saslavsky and Shepherd, 2012). 
Taking garments (column 3), we see that two of the three interaction terms are statistically 
insignificant. Only the coefficient of the interaction term with the dummy for small firms is positive 
and statistically significant. This finding suggests that trade facilitation has the same impact for all 
categories of firms except small ones, for which it is significantly attenuated. This result lines up with 
the contention that trade facilitation matters more for larger firms, but from that point of view, it is 
strange not to see micro and medium enterprises affected in the same way as small ones. Given this 
inconsistency and the relatively low number of observations for a firm-level data set, we conclude that 
results for the garments sector only provide weak evidence in favor of the contention that small firms 
do not benefit from trade facilitation. 
Results for food (column 4) show that export time is not a significant determinant of export 
performance for firms of any size. This surprising result is perhaps due to the fact that the Enterprise 
Surveys data probably do not capture much of the kind of new agricultural exporting activity that is 
driving growth of agrifood GVCs. On the one hand, the survey only includes firms, not farmers, who 
typically do not have any formal business entity in the developing world. Second, for many countries, 
horticultural goods and niche products like cut flowers—which are in fact highly perishable and 
therefore are likely to depend strongly on trade facilitation for their export performance—are not a 
significant part of the export bundle, and so probably are only marginally sampled in the Enterprise 
Surveys data. 
In electronics (column 5), as in the pooled model, none of the interaction terms are statistically 
significant. This finding means that for the best known GVC sector, trade facilitation has the same 
effect for firms of all sizes. Although the sample is very small, we would expect to see significant 
differences in this case because it is an area in which GVCs are particularly well developed. Results 
show, however, that there is no evidence in the case of electronics that trade facilitation is only a 
significant determinant of export performance for large companies. 
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5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Whether we are talking about trade facilitation in the broad sense of reducing trade costs or in the 
WTO sense of streamlining border procedures, the empirical evidence from econometric studies and 
CGE models is overwhelming: improvements have the potential to bring major economic gains in 
terms of increased trade and real incomes. Moreover, the available evidence—although scant—
suggests that even when the sometimes significant upfront costs of trade facilitation are netted out, the 
benefit-cost balance is strongly positive. In a global sense, trade facilitation is a “good deal” for 
countries, in that it has the potential to bring economic benefits at least on a par with, and perhaps well 
in excess of, those that would come from a major round of tariff cuts in manufacturing. 
However, from a negotiating standpoint, as well from the point of view of development policy, it is 
not just the global economic gains that matter, but also their distribution. Two questions are important. 
First, is it primarily developed countries that stand to reap significant gains from improved trade 
facilitation, or will developing countries also gain? Second, and tied to the first, in the context of 
GVCs, is it only large firms (mostly headquartered in developed countries) that benefit from trade 
facilitation, to the exclusion of small suppliers (mostly located in developing countries)? On the first 
question, the available empirical evidence suggests that developing and developed countries both 
stand to gain from improved trade facilitation. In particular, exports are expected to increase for both 
country groups. Some parties have raised concerns that developing country imports might, however, 
increase more rapidly than exports, thereby causing balance of payments problems for developing 
countries. However, there is no economic basis for believing that this would be the case. The balance 
of payments is determined by macroeconomic forces within a country, most fundamentally the ratio of 
savings to investment. Trade policy of any type—be it tariffs or trade facilitation—plays almost no 
role in the determination of the balance of payments, except in the very short term while 
macroeconomic variables like the exchange rate are adjusting. Developing countries can therefore feel 
reasonably certain that they stand to reap real economic gains from improved trade facilitation, partly 
through increased exports, partly through cheaper access to imported intermediate goods that are used 
by their own producers and exporters and partly through a reduction in socially wasteful activity that 
lowers the costs of trade goods and increases real incomes. 
This paper has focused more particularly on the second question, since it is empirical in nature, but 
has not been subject to any rigorous testing. For the contention that trade facilitation only benefits 
large, mostly foreign owned firms to hold in the GVC context, one of two conditions must be met. 
One possibility is that there is a lack of competition between value chains, such that lead firms act as 
oligopsonists with respect to suppliers, and are thus able to appropriate the potential trade facilitation 
gains as rents. An alternative problem could be that suppliers incur large sunk costs in adapting their 
production processes to the needs of one lead firm, and therefore cannot easily change. The result in 
the second case would be the same as in the first, and the lead firm would be able to appropriate at 
least part of the potential gains from trade facilitation as rents, rather than passing them on to other 
firms and consumers. 
The contention that only large, lead firms benefit from trade facilitation is one that we would 
expect to see reflected in firm-level data if it is true. We have tested it here using a large dataset from a 
variety of developing countries, and have found no consistent evidence in its favor. Generally 
speaking, firms of all sizes benefit from improved trade facilitation by exporting more in response to 
improvements like reductions in the time taken to export goods. Although there are some differences 
in the data at a sectoral level, particularly for garments, our conclusion is that except under special 
circumstances that do not appear to hold in practice, small firms stand to benefit from trade facilitation 
through the same mechanism that large ones do. As a result, countries where small, supplier firms are 
prevalent and lead firms are few or nonexistent—which is the case for many developing countries—
also stand to gain from improved trade facilitation. 
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In terms of policy, our results and review of the literature suggest two main conclusions. First, 
those interested in supporting small producers and exporters in developing countries—policymakers, 
researchers, and the development community—should actively support improved trade facilitation in 
developing countries. It flows from this that the same parties should welcome a WTO Agreement on 
Trade Facilitation. 
Second, the arguments that have been put forward by some in the policy community as reasons for 
developing countries to be wary of the trade facilitation debate do not stand up to empirical scrutiny. 
On the one hand, the contention that improved trade facilitation may worsen balance of payments 
problems in some developing countries ignores the fact that it is macroeconomic factors (savings and 
investment) that determine the balance of payments, not trade policy. In addition, the fact that small 
firms can benefit in the same way as large firms from improved trade facilitation means that 
economies where supplier firms are prevalent but lead firms are not still stand to gain from trade 
facilitation reforms. Distributional issues are, of course, important to the political economy of trade 
negotiations, and to their development implications. But in this case, distributional concerns do not 
undermine the wealth of evidence showing that trade facilitation can boost trade and real incomes 
across the globe, in countries at all levels of development. This is not to deny that gains from trade 
facilitation could be distributed unequally or that governments should monitor the impacts of trade 
facilitation initiatives. In this area – as more generally – it is important that reforms and projects are 
designed in a way that allows assessments of impacts over time.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Variables, definitions, and sources 
Variable Definition Year Source 
% Direct Exports Percentage of an establishment’s total sales 
accounted for by direct exports 
Various Enterprise Surveys 
question d3b 
Foreign Dummy variable equal to unity for 
establishments that are owned more than 50% 
by foreign private individuals, companies, or 
organizations 
Various Enterprise Surveys 
question b2b  
Log(Capacity 
Utilization) 
Logarithm of the establishment’s current output 
in comparison with its maximum possible output 
over the last year 
Various Enterprise Surveys 
question f1 
Log(Capital 
Intensity) 
Logarithm of the net book value of total assets 
per permanent and temporary or seasonal full 
time employee 
Various Enterprise Surveys 
questions l1, l6, 
n6a, and n6b 
Log(Export time) Logarithm of the average number of days taken 
for direct exports between arrival at the main 
point of exit and clearance by customs 
Various Enterprise Surveys 
question d4 
Medium Dummy variable equal to unity for 
establishments with more than 50 but no more 
than 250 permanent and temporary or seasonal 
full time employees in the last fiscal year 
Various Enterprise Surveys 
questions l1 and l6 
Micro Dummy variable equal to unity for 
establishments with 10 or fewer permanent and 
temporary or seasonal full time employees in the 
last fiscal year 
Various Enterprise Surveys 
questions l1 and l6 
Small Dummy variable equal to unity for 
establishments with more than 10 but no more 
than 50 permanent and temporary or seasonal 
full time employees in the last fiscal year 
Various Enterprise Surveys 
questions l1 and l6 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
% Direct Exports 36744 0.100 0.251 0 1 
Foreign 36626 0.091 0.288 0 1 
Log(Capacity Utilization) 30474 4.222 0.429 -0.693 4.654 
Log(Capital Intensity) 23581 12.137 3.048 -2.996 26.801 
Log(Export time) 7890 1.222 1.078 0 7.599 
Medium 36907 0.255 0.436 0 1 
Micro 36907 0.213 0.409 0 1 
Small 36907 0.430 0.495 0 1 
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Table 3: Regression results 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
All All Garments Food Electronics 
Log(Export Time) -0.148*** -0.137*** -0.338*** -0.095 -0.479* 
 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.292) (0.072) 
Log(Export Time) * Micro 0.113 0.118 0.265 -0.299 0.186 
 
(0.294) (0.384) (0.312) (0.295) (0.843) 
Log(Export Time) * Small 0.080 0.083 0.284* -0.067 0.647 
 
(0.131) (0.220) (0.055) (0.534) (0.112) 
Log(Export Time) * Medium 0.098** 0.083 0.086 0.111 0.511 
 
(0.025) (0.106) (0.476) (0.219) (0.159) 
Micro -0.462** -0.223 -1.222** 0.801* -0.559 
 
(0.012) (0.333) (0.021) (0.066) (0.473) 
Small -0.455*** -0.339*** -1.293*** 0.160 -1.348** 
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.391) (0.014) 
Medium -0.266*** -0.181* -0.660** -0.111 -0.538 
 
(0.001) (0.059) (0.027) (0.475) (0.183) 
Log(Capital Intensity)  -0.007    
 
 (0.669)    
Log(Capacity Utilization)  -0.049    
 
 (0.464)    
Foreign  0.493***    
 
 (0.000)    
ISO  0.079    
 
 (0.192)    
Observations 7858 5538 1128 1330 203 
R2 0.029 0.029 0.190 0.001 0.234 
Fixed Effects 
Country-
Sector-Year 
Country-
Sector-Year 
Country-
Year 
Country-
Year 
Country-
Year 
Note: The dependent variable in all cases is % Direct Exports. Regression is by fractional logit. R2 is 
calculated as the square of the correlation between actual and fitted values. P-values based on 
standard errors adjusted for clustering in the same dimension as the fixed effects appear in 
parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by: * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%). 
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